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Abstract: We examine the role of the Indian diaspora in the outsourcing of work to 
India.  Our  data  are  taken  from  oDesk,  the  world’s  largest  online  platform  for  outsourced 
contracts.  Despite  oDesk  minimizing  many  of  the  frictions  that  diaspora  connections  have 
traditionally  overcome,  diaspora  connections  still  matter  on  oDesk,  with  ethnic  Indians 
substantially more likely to choose a worker in India. This higher placement is the result of a 
greater likelihood of choosing India for the initial contract and substantial path dependence in 
location  choices.  We  further  examine  wage  and  performance  outcomes  of  outsourcing  as  a 
function of ethnic connections. Our examination of potential rationales for the greater ethnic-
based placement of contracts assesses taste-based preferences and information differences. 
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1. Introduction 
The economic integration of developing countries into world markets is an important stepping 
stone for economic transitions and growth. This integration can be quite challenging, however, 
due to the many differences across countries in languages, cultural understanding, legal 
regulations, etc. As a consequence, business and social networks can be valuable mechanisms for 
achieving this integration (Rauch 2001). Ethnicity-based interactions and diaspora connections 
are a prominent form of these networks. The benefits typically cited for diaspora networks 
include stronger access to information (especially very recent or tacit knowledge), matching and 
referral services that link firms together, language skills and cultural sensitivity that improve 
interactions, and repeated relationships that embed trust in uncertain environments and provide 
sanction mechanisms for misbehavior. Such traits are hard to construct yet crucial for business 
success in many developed and emerging economies. The history of these connections stretches 
back to the earliest of international exchanges (e.g., Aubet 2001), and studies continue to find 
diasporas important for trade flows, foreign investments, and knowledge diffusion. 
Over the last two decades, the Internet has become a potent force for global economic 
exchanges. The Internet links customers and companies together worldwide, enables labor to be 
provided at a distance, provides instant access to information about foreign locations, and much 
more. How will the Internet affect the importance of diaspora networks?  On one hand, the 
substantial improvements in connectivity and reduced frictions of the Internet may weaken the 
importance of diasporas. Alternatively, online capabilities may instead provide an effective tool 
that complements traditional diaspora connections (e.g., Saxenian 2006), and online platforms 
may present new informational obstacles (e.g., Autor 2001) that diaspora can help overcome. To 
shed light on the role of the diaspora in online markets, we investigate the role of the Indian 
diaspora in outsourcing to India using data from oDesk. oDesk is the world’s largest online labor 
market, processing $30 million per month in contracts as of May 2012. It provides a platform for 
companies to post job opportunities, interview workers, monitor performance, and pay 
compensation. Workers worldwide bid on jobs, complete tasks, and receive public feedback. 
India is the largest country destination for outsourced contracts on oDesk, with more than 
a third of the worldwide contract volume. We investigate the role of the Indian diaspora using 
both descriptive and analytical techniques. A key feature of our data development, described in 3 
 
greater detail below, is that we identify company contacts located anywhere around the world 
who are likely of Indian ethnicity using ethnic name matching procedures. Our measures of 
diaspora-linked outsourcing to India build upon this identification of ethnic Indians (e.g., those 
with the surnames Gupta or Desai) who are using oDesk. 
We find that overseas ethnic Indians are more likely to outsource to India than non-ethnic 
Indians. In relative terms, the increase in likelihood is 16%. This higher likelihood is evident 
among many types of contracts and at different points of time, but its key feature is its 
importance in employers’ initial contract placement. These initial contracts are vital because the 
location choices of outsourced work for company contacts are very persistent. We then analyze 
wage and performance outcomes. These exercises first emphasize that workers in India are paid 
wages on diaspora-based contracts that are typical on oDesk for the type of work being 
undertaken in India. Likewise, workers’ current performance and career outcomes appear to be 
very similar across the contract types. From the hiring company’s perspective, by contrast, 
diaspora-based connections to India provide cost advantages relative to the other contracts that 
these company contacts form on oDesk. These cost advantages, however, come with some 
deteriorations in performance, yielding an ambiguous net consequence.  
Beyond the characterization of these patterns, which are interesting in their own right, we 
use them to evaluate possible explanations for the source of the bias in ethnic contract placement. 
Descriptive features of the data cast doubt on several rationales traditionally given for diaspora 
linkages. The ethnic bias does not appear linked to uncertainty during oDesk’s founding period 
or to the easier transfer of specialized or tacit knowledge. Likewise, the very similar wage and 
performance outcomes for workers in India across the two contract types suggests a limited role 
for greater bargaining power of ethnic Indians with workers in their home region or for 
productivity advantages that ethnic Indians possess when working with India.  
Our attention then turns to distinguishing between taste-based preferences and statistical 
discrimination/information differences. The former suggests members of an ethnic group prefer 
to work with each other, while the latter suggests ethnic Indians may have informational 
advantages that lead them to search out opportunities with workers in India. These two factors 
are often quite difficult to disentangle due to researchers being limited to making inference from 
data containing only aggregate wages or demand for labor of different types (e.g., Altonji and 4 
 
Blank 1999, Giuliano, Levine, and Leonard 2009). Our task is made somewhat easier, at least in 
principle, by the fact that we consider differences across separate types of employers that we can 
group in the data. Few other papers have direct measures that link demand for different types of 
workers to the identity of employers. We are also aided by the direct observation of performance 
outcomes, and thus we do need to solely rely on wage differences to infer productivity 
consequences.  
Models of statistical discrimination and information differences predict that ethnic Indian 
company contacts should be able to exploit situations where little knowledge is publicly 
available about a workers’ ability. If ethnic Indian company contacts possess information 
advantages, one would expect to detect ethnic Indians hiring a relatively large share of 
inexperienced Indian workers while enjoying either productivity or wage advantages precisely 
because details about worker ability are sparse. While we find that the ethnic bias is largest for 
hiring inexperienced workers in India, consistent with information differences, other predictions 
of the information-difference model are not detected.  
In particular, there are no detectible productivity or wage differences when an Indian 
diaspora company contact hires either inexperienced or experienced Indian workers. In addition, 
it does not appear that the Indian diaspora is advantaged in selecting talented workers. Diaspora-
based contracts do not provide future career advantages for ethnic Indian workers and 
inexperienced workers on diaspora-based contracts are no more likely to go on to successful 
careers on oDesk.  With no evidence of mean productivity or wage differences on these 
contracts, a model of statistical discrimination has difficulty explaining the initial ethnic bias in 
hiring if employers’ beliefs about mean productivity are correct on average.
1   
These findings push us towards taste-based preferences as a key factor. We are quite 
cautious in this conclusion, as multiple factors may exist in such a complex environment. While 
we are unable to say whether the taste-based preferences lie more with the ethnic Indians or more 
with the comparison groups (e.g., Anglo-Saxon company contacts being less inclined to utilize 
some Indian workers), these biases clearly play an important role in initial choices. These 
                                                 
1 As dicussed later in Section 8, we also consider and find evidence against explanations relying on ethnic 
Indian and non-ethnic Indian employers having different beliefs about the variance of Indian worker productivity.  5 
 
choices then have lasting consequences, as employers are less likely to experiment with future 
workers if past contracts achieve acceptable performance.  
These results are quite striking. oDesk’s business model seeks to minimize many frictions 
and barriers to outsourcing—for example, providing companies with knowledge of workers for 
hire overseas and their qualifications, providing infrastructure for monitoring and payments 
between companies and workers, and creating a labor market where workers build reputations 
that enable future work and higher wages. These frictions that oDesk seeks to minimize, of 
course, are frictions that diaspora networks have historically been used to overcome. Our work 
suggests that diasporas continue to be important in an online world—if for no other reason than 
preferences or small information differences that shape contract placement. We view our results 
as a lower bound on the importance of diasporas in settings where frictions are larger.  
At a higher level, the Indian diaspora likely played an important, but modest, role in 
India’s rapid development on oDesk. At several points, we provide descriptive evidence of the 
magnitudes of these interactions that place upper bounds on how large this role could have been. 
For example, ethnic Indians account for 3.9% of oDesk company users in the United States by 
contract volume, while 29% of outsourced contracts from the United States go to India. We 
likewise find that only 5.7% of workers in India who complete three or more jobs on oDesk had 
their initial contract with an overseas ethnic Indian employer. These magnitudes suggest that 
diaspora continue to use online platforms in an effective manner, but that they play a modest role 
in the overall development of online work, at least for a country of India’s properties, and likely 
had limited consequences for the overall market structure of oDesk. 
With these results in mind, it is important to place our study of the Indian diaspora in 
perspective. We focus on a single ethnicity in this analysis, rather than undertaking a multi-
ethnicity comparison study, to facilitate greater depth around one example. India was the natural 
choice given its worldwide importance for outsourcing. India also has operational advantages in 
that its common names are fairly distinct from other ethnic groups. Yet it is also important to 
consider India’s properties and the generalizability of our results. India’s conditions suggest that 
it may be an upper bound in terms of the aggregate impact from these connections. It may also 6 
 
be the case that other ethnic diaspora face a steeper trade-off in terms of wage rates and 
performance outcomes than the Indian case that we describe below.
2  
Our work contributes to a developing literature that explores the operation of online labor 
markets and the matching of firms and workers. Agrawal, Lacetera, and Lyons (2012) find that 
workers from less-developed countries have greater difficulty contracting work with developed 
countries on oDesk. This is especially true for initial contracts, and the disadvantage closes 
somewhat with the worker’s platform experience. The authors suggest that some of this difficulty 
may be due to challenges that companies in advanced economies encounter when evaluating 
workers abroad. Our study suggests that diaspora connections to advanced economies help 
workers access these initial contracts, although as noted above this effect is of modest size 
relative to the overall development of oDesk in India. Mill (2013) studies statistical 
discrimination and employer learning through experience with hiring in particular countries. We 
find patterns similar to those in Mill’s work that are consistent with employer learning about 
groups of workers. Our work on ethnic connections provides an important foundation for 
understanding how this learning process commences while locating its boundaries. In this spirit, 
our work relates to two other studies that utilize oDesk to consider the development of 
information about employees on oDesk. Using a creative experimental study, Pallais (2011) finds 
that employers experiment with inexperienced workers too infrequently from a social-welfare 
perspective (e.g., Tervio 2009). Our path dependency results offer a related message to Pallais, 
demonstrating there is limited experimentation if initial selections are performing at an 
acceptable level. Finally, Stanton and Thomas (2011) also document that intermediation has 
arisen in the oDesk market to overcome information problems about worker quality.
3   
                                                 
2 First, India’s wage rate is low enough that it can be very attractive for outsourcing, and such gains would 
be weaker for higher-wage locations (e.g., the European diaspora). Second, India possesses several attractive traits 
needed for oDesk to operate effectively: English language proficiency, Internet penetration, available banking 
facilities, etc. Without these necessary ingredients, it may be harder for diaspora connections to emerge around 
online labor outsourcing. Third, and most speculatively, there may be required levels of critical mass, in terms of the 
diaspora abroad and the potential workers in the country. Future research needs to analyze these traits more broadly.  
3 Autor (2001) and Horton (2010) review online labor markets. Montgomery (1991) models social 
networks in labor markets. Beyond labor markets, Forman, Ghose, and Goldfarb (2009) study the interplay between 
local and online consumer options. Freedman and Jin (2008) and Agrawal, Catalini, and Goldfarb (2012) study 
social networks in online lending. An example of off-line work in this regard is Fisman, Paravisini, and Vig (2012). 7 
 
The findings in this paper also relate to research investigating the outsourcing of work 
from advanced economies, the emergence of incremental innovation in developing countries, and 
connections between immigration and outsourcing.
4  More broadly, these findings contribute to 
understanding the role of diaspora and ethnic networks in economic exchanges across countries. 
Ethnic networks have been shown to play important roles in promoting international trade, 
investment, and cross-border financing activity, with recent work particularly emphasizing the 
role of educated or skilled immigrants.
5  This work has further emphasized the role of diaspora 
connections in technology transfer.
6  Our analysis is among the first to be able to study 
outsourcing as a channel, and we derive evidence that links diaspora to both greater use of oDesk 
by ethnic Indians in a country and greater flows of outsourced work to India.
7 
These findings are important for managers. Generally, the development and growth of 
online labor markets represents an enormous change in terms of human resource decisions that 
firms make. Labor has traditionally been among the most localized of resources to a firm, and the 
ability of managers to use platforms like oDesk to globally outsource work effectively and 
cheaply will influence how competitive their firms are going forward. This lesson will more 
                                                 
4 For example, Feenstra and Hanson (2005), Liu and Trefler (2008, 2011), Amiti and Wei (2009), Blinder 
and Krueger (2009), Ebenstein et al. (2009), Puga and Trefler (2010), Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright (2010), Mithas 
and Lucas (2010), Harrison and McMillan (2011), and Tambe and Hitt (2012). Banerjee and Duflo (2000), Khanna 
(2008), and Ghani (2010) consider aspects of these phenomena for India specifically. Wang, Barron, and Seidmann 
(1997), Cachon and Harker (2002), and Novak and Stern (2008) provide related models of the sourcing choice. 
5 Broad reviews of diaspora effects include Rauch (2001), Freeman (2006), Clemens (2011), Docquier and 
Rapoport (2011), and Gibson and MacKenzie (2011). Evidence on foreign direct investment includes Saxenian 
(1999, 2002, 2006), Arora and Gambardella (2005), Buch, Kleinert, and Toubal (2006), Kugler and Rapoport (2007, 
2011), Bhattacharya and Groznik (2008), Docquier and Lodigiani (2010), Iriyama, Li, and Madhavan (2010), 
Huang, Jin, and Qian (2011), Nachum (2011), Hernandez (2011), Javorcik et al. (2011), Rangan and Drummond 
(2011), and Foley and Kerr (2013). Evidence on trade includes Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998), Rauch (1999), 
Rauch and Trindade (2002), Kerr (2009), Rangan and Sengul (2009), and Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk (2011). 
6 Recent work includes Kapur (2001), Kapur and McHale (2005a,b), Agrawal, Cockburn, and McHale 
(2006), MacGarvie (2006), Nanda and Khanna (2010), Oettl and Agrawal (2008), Kerr (2008), Agrawal et al. 
(2011), and Foley and Kerr (2013). Singh (2005), Obukhova (2009), Choudhury (2010), and Hovhannisyan and 
Keller (2010) study related forms of international labor mobility and technology diffusion, and Keller (2004) 
provides a review. Marx and Singh (2012) consider knowledge flows and borders versus distance. 
7 Our working paper contains gravity-model analyses that link a larger general Indian diaspora in nations to 
greater oDesk use by ethnic Indians located in those countries. This analysis connects studies that consider diasporas 
from a macro perspective (e.g., linking trade flows to diaspora shares by country) with studies that consider micro 
evidence (e.g., that patent citations are more likely among inventors of the same ethnicity). 8 
 
broadly apply to many other forms of trade in services as well. With respect to innovation and 
entrepreneurship, many companies are already using platforms like oDesk to outsource 
technological work to cheaper locations. Blinder and Krueger (2009) estimate that 34% to 58% 
of jobs in the professional, scientific and technical services industry can be offshored from the 
United States, two or three times higher than the national average. This outsourcing has become 
especially common among cash-strapped start-up companies for website development and 
mobile apps (e.g., Kerr and Brownell 2013). We provide new insights about how diaspora 
connections shape these contract flows and the biases that managers may have in their choices. 
Our work also provides insights on the overall effectiveness of outsourcing contracts to India.  
 
2. oDesk Outsourcing Platform and Ethnicity Assignments 
oDesk is an online platform that connects workers who supply services with buyers who pay for 
and receive these services from afar. Examples include data-entry and programming tasks. The 
platform began operating in 2005. oDesk is now the world’s largest platform for online 
outsourcing.
8 The oDesk market is a unique setting to study the diaspora’s impact on economic 
exchanges due to its recent emergence and exceptionally detailed records. One important feature 
is that any worker can contract with any firm directly, and all work takes place and is monitored 
via a proprietary online system. In exchange for a 10% transaction fee, oDesk provides a 
comprehensive management and billing system that records worker time on the job, allows easy 
communication between workers and employers about scheduled tasks, and takes random 
screenshots of workers’ computer terminals to allow monitoring electronically. These features 
facilitate easy, standardized contracting, and any company and any worker can form electronic 
employment relationships with very little effort. 
A worker who wants to provide services on oDesk fills out an online profile describing 
his/her skills, education, and experience. A worker’s entire history of oDesk employment, 
                                                 
8 oDesk’s expansion mainly reflects increasing demand for online labor services over time. Statistics from 
compete.com, a company that tracks Internet traffic, show that unique visits to oDesk and its four largest 
competitors (some of which pre-date oDesk) increased simultaneously in recent years. Overall growth of online 
outsourcing slowed with the financial crisis, but oDesk has continued to grow rapidly. 9 
 
including wages and hours, is publicly observable. For jobs that have ended, a feedback measure 
from previous work is publicly displayed. Figure 1 provides an example of a worker profile. 
Companies and individuals looking to hire on oDesk fill out a job description, including 
the skills required, the expected contract duration, and some preferred worker characteristics. 
After oDesk’s founding, most of the jobs posted were hourly positions for technology-related or 
programming tasks (e.g., web development), but postings for administrative assistance, data 
entry, graphic design, and smaller categories have become more prevalent as the platform has 
grown. After a company posts a position opening, workers apply for the job and bid an hourly 
rate. Firms can interview workers via oDesk, followed by an ultimate contract being formed. 
We study the role of the Indian diaspora in facilitating oDesk contracts to India. Our data 
begin at oDesk’s founding in 2005 and run through August of 2010. The data were obtained 
directly from oDesk with the stipulation that they be used for research purposes and not reveal 
information about individual companies or workers. oDesk does not collect a person’s ethnicity 
or country of birth, so we use the names of company contacts to probabilistically assign 
ethnicities. This matching approach exploits the fact that individuals with surnames like 
Chatterjee or Patel are significantly more likely to be ethnically Indian than individuals with 
surnames like Wang, Martinez, or Johnson. Our matching procedure exploits two databases 
originally developed for marketing purposes, common naming conventions, and hand-collected 
frequent names from multiple sources like population censuses and baby registries. The process 
assigns individuals a likelihood of being Indian or one of eight other ethnic groups.
9  
Several features of this work should be noted. First, some records cannot be matched to 
an ethnicity, either due to incomplete records for listed ethnicities (e.g., very obscure names) or 
to uncovered ethnic groups (e.g., African ethnicities). Second, this approach can describe ethnic 
origins, but it cannot ascertain immigration status. For example, a U.S.-based company contact 
with the surname Singh is assigned to be of ethnic Indian origin, but the approach cannot say 
whether the individual is a first- or later-generation immigrant. Third, while we focus on the 
Indian ethnicity, attempting to match on all nine ethnic groups is important given that some 
                                                 
9 The ethnic groups are Anglo-Saxon, Chinese, European, Hispanic, Indian, Japanese, Korean, Russian, and 
Vietnamese. Kerr (2007, 2008) and Kerr and Lincoln (2010) provide extended details on the matching process, list 
frequent ethnic names, and provide descriptive statistics and quality assurance exercises. Stanton and Thomas 
(2011) further describe the oDesk platform. 10 
 
names overlap across ethnicities (e.g., D’Souza in the Indian context due to past colonization). 
Finally, while we use the terminology “Indian” for our ethnic assignment, it is worth noting that 
the procedure more broadly captures South Asian ethnic origin.
10  
We assign ethnicities to company contacts undertaking hiring on oDesk, with a match 
rate of 88%.
11 The company contact is the individual within each firm that hires and pays for the 
service. In most cases, this company contact is the decision maker for a hire. This is good for our 
study in that we want to evaluate the role of ethnic connections in outsourcing decisions, and this 
structure illuminates for us the person within the larger firm making the hiring choice.
12 
It is important to note that during our sample period job postings only list the company 
location, not the company contact’s name. We know the contact’s identity through oDesk’s 
administrative records, but potential job seekers do not observe the names of individuals. This 
asymmetry removes much of the potential sorting of job applicants across contract opportunities 
in terms of company contact ethnicity (e.g., workers in India bidding more frequently for 
postings from ethnic Indians in the United States). We cannot rule out, however, that some 
inference is made through company names, for example. In coming analyses, we will control 
directly for share the share of applications coming from India as a robustness check.
13   
                                                 
10 Names originating from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, etc. overlap too much to allow strict parsing. We do 
not believe this name overlap has material consequences. The imprecision will lead to our descriptive estimates 
being slightly off in terms of their levels, but not by much given that India has by far the largest South Asian 
diaspora. For regressions, measurement error would typically result in the estimates of network effects being 
downward biased, but even here this is not clear to the extent that other South Asians more likely to work with India. 
11 This match rate rises somewhat when removing records that are either missing names or have non-name 
entries in the name field (e.g., either the company is listed in the name field or a bogus name like “test”). The four 
most common surnames linked with the Indian ethnicity are Kumar, Singh, Ahmed, and Sharma.  
12 A related limitation, however, is that the oDesk data do not easily link company contacts into larger 
firms. This structure limits our ability to describe the firm size distribution on oDesk, but for most applications this 
has limited consequence. For researchers, this structure is operationally quite similar to patent assignee codes/names.  
13 Conditional on the year x job type x country of the company contact, there are only very small 
differences in the rate at which workers in India apply for the jobs posted by ethnic Indians versus other ethnic 
groups. Regressions find a 0.016 (0.009)* higher share of applicants from India on contracts listed by ethnic Indians 
who do not actively use the search feature. This higher share comes from companies’ subsequent contracts [0.021 
(0.011)*] compared to initial contracts [-0.002 (0.014)]. As an additional note, our data do not indicate whether side 
arrangments form between companies and workers. We suspect, but cannot verify, that the number of cases where 
an employer asks a pre-arranged contact to enlist on oDesk in order to employ them is low due to the fees that 
oDesk charges. It is more likely that successful employment relationships move offline and into side arrangements 
to circumvent oDesk fees. This would potentially impact our analysis to the extent that the likelihood of moving 11 
 
 
3. Descriptive Features 
 Table 1 presents the top 20 countries outsourcing work to India on oDesk. The United States is 
by far the largest source of oDesk contracts going to India, with 31,261 contracts over the five-
year period. A majority of all contracts on oDesk originate from the United States. The 
distribution of contract counts has a prominent tail. The United States is followed by Australia, 
the United Kingdom, and Canada, which combined equal about a third of the U.S. volume. 
Spain, the 10th largest country in terms of volume, has less than 1% of the U.S. volume. Column 
4 shows a very close correspondence of contract counts to distinct outsourcing spells, where the 
latter definition groups repeated, sequential contracts between the same worker and employee. 
Columns 5 and 6 show the share of contracts originating from each country that go to 
India, both in total and relative to cross-border contracts only (i.e., excluding oDesk contracts 
formed with workers in the source country). Contracts to India represent a 29% share of all 
contracts originating from the United States and a 33% share of cross-border contracts. Across 
the top 20 countries, India’s share of a country’s contract total volume ranges from 18% in 
Switzerland to 55% in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The unweighted average of the top 20 
countries is 28%. The UAE is an exceptional case that we describe further below.  
Column 7 documents the share of company contacts in each country with an ethnically 
Indian name, regardless of how they use oDesk, while Column 8 provides the ethnic Indian 
percentage of company contacts on contracts that are being outsourced to India. For the United 
States, 3.9% of all company contacts who use oDesk are ethnically Indian, while the share is 
4.6% for work outsourced to India.
14 This higher use for India specifically can be conveniently 
                                                                                                                                                             
offline was greater for diaspora-based connections. We have not seen evidence to suspect that side arrangements 
have an ethnic bias to them; rates of continuing to use oDesk do not differ substantially across contract types. 
14 To put these figures in perspective, 0.9% of the U.S. population in the 2010 Census of Populations was 
born in India. These numbers are not exactly comparable, as our measure is based off of ethnicity, rather than 
country of birth, and includes South Asia more generally. Nonetheless, even after taking these features into account, 
the role of Indians on oDesk is perhaps twice as strong as the overall Indian population share. As a second 
comparison point, Kerr and Lincoln (2010) estimate the ethnic Indian share of U.S. inventors to be about 5% in 
2005 using patent records from the United States Patent and Trademark Office. This second comparison point uses 
the same name matching approach as the current project. It thus suggests that Indians may use oDesk somewhat less 
as a share of total users compared to their general presence in high-tech sectors. 12 
 
expressed as a ratio of 1.18 between the two shares. The average ratio across all 20 countries is 
1.30, with 13 nations having a ratio greater than one. Finally, Column 9 of Table 1 lists the 
average hourly wage paid to Indian workers on outsourced contracts. The range across the top 20 
countries is from $7 to $12, with an average of $10. As the average wage on oDesk for data entry 
and administrative support jobs is below $3 per hour, the contracts being outsourced to India 
represent relatively skilled work that involves programming and technical skills.  
Thus, the descriptive data suggest a special role for diaspora connections in sending work 
to India. The next sections more carefully quantify this role when taking into account potential 
confounding factors (e.g., the types of projects being outsourced), finding that this special role 
persists. But we also should not lose sight of the absolute quantity of the shares. Ethnic Indians 
in the United States account for about 5% of the U.S.’s outsourced work to India. The average 
across the top 20 countries is 7%, falling to 3% when excluding the UAE. While ethnic Indians 
are more likely to send work to India, the rise of India to be the top worker source on oDesk also 
appears to have much broader roots than diaspora connections.  
The unpublished App. Tables 1a-2 provide additional descriptive statistics. The top 
company contacts that send work to India display significant heterogeneity in terms of their 
geographic location and the overall degree to which they rely on India for outsourcing work. 
These company lists also highlight that, while much of the diaspora’s effect comes through the 
small actions of many individuals, the actions of a few can have an enormous impact. In 
particular, there is one company contact in the UAE that accounted for 906 of the UAE’s 989 
contracts to India. This outlier is an ethnic Indian entrepreneur who uses oDesk for placing and 
managing outsourcing work, much of which is sent to India. Studies of diaspora networks often 
speculate about the concentrated importance of single individuals (e.g., Kuznetsov 2009), and 
oDesk provides some of the first quantifiable evidence of this concentration. This individual 
accounts for 7.7 times more contracts being sent to India than the next highest company contact 
and 2.4 times the volume from the Netherlands, the sixth-ranked country in Table 1. 
 13 
 
4. Ethnicity and Persistence in Outsourcing Patterns 
This section describes the persistence in the geographic placement of contracts by company 
contacts. This persistence emphasizes the important role of initial contracts, which we analyze in 
greater detail in Section 5. Sections 6-8 then consider wage and performance outcomes. 
Table 2 describes the key path dependency that company contacts display in the way they 
engage with India on oDesk. The sample includes all first and second contracts formed by 
company contacts located outside of India. The first row documents that 39% of ethnic Indians 
choose India for their initial outsourcing contract. This rate compares to 32% for non-ethnic 
Indians, and the 7% difference between these shares is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The next two rows show a strong contrast when looking at second contracts. Differences across 
ethnicities no longer link to differences in propensities to choose India; the more critical factor is 
whether the initial contract outsourced by the company contact went to India. Subsequent 
contracts have similar properties to the second contract, and the same pattern is evident when 
considering unique outsourcing employment spells. This pattern continues to hold when unique 
worker-company spells are used as the unit of analysis to assess the sensitivity of results to re-
contracting and simultaneous auditions by employers. Thus, with all the caveats that need to be 
applied to sample averages, these simple descriptives suggest that ethnicity could play an 
important role in initial contract placements, with path dependency then taking on a larger role. 
What drives this strong persistence in geographic choices? A very likely candidate is 
whether or not the company contact has a good experience on the first contract. Good 
experiences can create inertia where other options are not considered or adequately tested. Table 
3 examines this possibility with linear probability models of the location choice of second 
contracts or outsourcing spells. The estimating equation takes the form  
, i i i
i i tjc i
Indian tactEthnic CompanyCon ful actSuccess FirstContr
Indian tactEthnic CompanyCon ful actSuccess FirstContr Outcome
 
  
   
    
 
where contracts or spells are indexed by i. In the first column, the dependent variable is an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one if the company contact chooses India again. The 
primary independent variables are an indicator variable for the first project being a success 
(“good” performance rating or higher on the public feedback score or a successful evaluation in 14 
 
the private post-employment survey), the probability that the company contact is of ethnic Indian 
origin,
15 and their interaction. To control for many potential confounding factors, regressions 
include fixed effects for the (year t) x (job category j) x (country c) of each company contract. 
Thus, the analysis compares, for example, ethnic Indians and non-ethnic Indians outsourcing 
web development work from the United Kingdom in 2009. 
The results in the first column speak very strongly for how good experiences on initial 
contracts generate persistence. Success on the first contract raises the likelihood of staying in 
India by 6.6% compared to a baseline of 57%. Ethnic Indians are somewhat more likely to 
choose India again, conditional on the rating of the first project, but these differences are 
marginally significant. Columns 2 and 3 show similar results when requiring a one-day gap 
between contracts (e.g., to remove very rapid assignments or recruitment auditions) or when 
considering employment spells, respectively. Columns 4-6 show that this effect is tightly linked 
with whether or not the company contact continues at all with outsourcing on oDesk. In total, 
58% of company contracts post more than one contract on oDesk, and this return to the platform 
is closely connected to how well the first experience went. This return probability is not linked to 
the ethnicity of the company contact. A mirror image effect exists for company contacts that 
outsourced their initial contracts outside of India. A successful first experience for a company 
contact outside of India lowers the likelihood of India being selected for later work. 
Table 4 extends these insights by estimating across the full oDesk sample the likelihood 
of selecting India by experience levels of company contacts. These estimations take the form  
i i tjc i Indian tactEthnic CompanyCon India ContractTo        . 
The dependent variable is an indicator variable for selecting a worker in India. Regressions are 
unweighted and include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact.
16  
                                                 
15 This probability is assigned from the name matching algorithm. Indian names are linked to 5.3% of 
company contacts. Indian names are fairly distinct, so that in 90% of these cases the ethnic assignment is unique to 
the Indian ethnicity. Where the Indian assignment overlaps with another ethnic group due to a shared name, the 
regressor takes a proportionate value between zero and one. Table 2 excluded fractional values for convenience. By 
comparison, about 0.2% of contracts to India have a common surname for workers and company contacts, indicating 
the broader foundation of these ethnic connections than that likely due to family-based connections or similar.  
16 We report standard errors that are two-way clustered by company and worker. This clustering strategy 
takes into account the repeated nature of our data for both companies and workers. It is important to note that the 15 
 
Panel A includes the full sample of contracts, excluding firms located in India. The first 
column is for all contracts regardless of type. In the full sample, we find a significant increase in 
the likelihood of selecting India as a destination for outsourcing contracts when the company 
contact is of ethnic Indian origin. An ethnic Indian is 4.7% more likely to select India as an 
outsourcing destination than other ethnicities. This represents a 16% increase in the likelihood of 
selecting India relative to the sample mean of 29%. If conditioning on year x job type fixed 
effects, rather than year x job type x country of company contact fixed effects, the effect is 8% in 
absolute terms and about 30% relative to the sample mean.  
This remarkable increase in ethnic placement could result from many factors, and our 
subsequent analyses discern the most likely interpretations. Panel B starts by isolating cases 
where a worker from India applies for the position before the contract is awarded. This is a 
natural first check against explanations that center on ethnic Indians posting job opportunities 
that are simply a better fit for Indian workers. For example, there may be distinct skills that 
Indians worldwide specialize in that our fixed effects do not adequately control for. The ethnicity 
bias in Panel B is comparable in absolute terms to what is observed in Panel A, and it represents 
a 6% increase on the restricted sample’s mean. These results show that the effect is quite similar 
when isolating contracts where the company contact has a known option of choosing India.  
A similar conclusion is also reached in Panel C when we instead control for the share of 
worker-initiated applications for the job posting that came from India. The coefficient is 12% in 
relative terms, compared to 16% in Panel A. This may indicate some modest sorting by 
applicants in response to the company name or other observable feature of the job posting, or 
perhaps that there are deeper technology specializations for workers in India that our base 
technology controls are not capturing. Either way, the ethnic placement effect persists when 
including this control. Unreported analyses using outsourcing spells are also very similar. 
Columns 2-4 split the sample by initial versus subsequent contracts, in the spirit of Table 
2’s descriptive tabulations. We again see a very prominent role for ethnicity in the location 
choice of the first contract placements. The estimates in Column 2 for initial contracts are very 
                                                                                                                                                             
likelihood of being ethnically Indian is not a generated regressor from the data. It is a metric based off of the 
individual’s names and external classifications of names. As the contact names are exactly known, this metric is the 
same as any other known trait of the person like gender or location.  16 
 
similar in magnitude to the 7% differential in sample means in Table 2, with the regression fixed 
effects now removing many potential confounding variables. Ethnicity’s role in the placement of 
subsequent contracts is again lower in point estimate than the initial contracts. Unlike Table 2, 
these estimates do not condition on the first contract being in India, so a more substantial ethnic 
role emerges because of the lack of accounting for path dependency off of the initial contract.
17 
Columns 5-8 further examine the third and later contracts of company contacts. Column 5 
shows that the ethnic bias in this group, along with the means of the dependent variables, is quite 
similar to Column 4. Columns 6-8 separate these subsequent contracts into three groups based 
upon their prior experiences. The reported means of the dependent variables are critically 
important. In Panel A, India is selected 35% of the time when the company contacts have had 
prior success outsourcing to India, 27% of the time when they have prior experience but no 
success, and only 13% of the time if they have not utilized India before. Thus, path dependency 
plays a key role. With the die so strongly cast, ethnicity is second order in importance compared 
to initial contract choices, while sometimes retaining statistical significance. We obtain very 
similar results when instead using six months of oDesk experience to group experience levels. 
 
5. Ethnic Diaspora Placements and Initial Contracts 
The previous section emphasizes the persistence in geographical placements of outsourcing 
contracts, and thus the lasting importance of initial contract choices. It is in these initial decisions 
that much of the ethnic effect occurs. Continuing with the regression framework of Table 4, 
Table 5 analyzes these initial contracts to learn more about the role of ethnicity. Table 1 repeats 
the base specification for initial contracts. The next columns split the initial contracts in various 
ways to look for clues within oDesk itself for what may be behind the ethnic bias.
18 
                                                 
17 When estimating pooled regressions over Columns 3 and 4 with fixed effects for (year t) x (job category 
j) x (country c) x (subsequent contract), the effects are statistically different at a 5% level in Panels B and C. 
Specifically, the linear differences for Panels A-C between initial and subsequent contracts among repeat users are -
0.027 (0.018), -0.068 (0.023)***, and -0.033 (0.014)**, respectively. 
18 A limit exists for how well internal variations can represent use of the platform as a whole. That is, we 
can understand more about the role of diaspora connections for overcoming uncertainty by comparing settings in 
oDesk characterized by more or less uncertainty. This internal variation, however, only imperfectly captures the 
extent to which diaspora overcome overall uncertainty regarding online outsourcing and oDesk. 17 
 
A starting point is evaluating whether the ethnicity bias is connected to the very early 
days of oDesk’s founding and the development of online outsourcing. Many accounts of diaspora 
connections suggest that they provide stability and structure in settings where formal institutions 
are weak, and perhaps the initial contract ethnicity bias stems from a similar environment during 
oDesk’s emergence. Columns 2 and 3 split the sample by contracts formed during 2008 and 
earlier versus contracts formed during 2009 and after. This partition suggests that the Indian 
placement effect is growing over time. The means of the dependent variables, moreover, 
highlight that India’s share of initial oDesk contracts is declining from its level in 2008. These 
patterns suggest that the differences seen in initial contracts are not due to diaspora overcoming 
initial uncertainty about oDesk. These patterns do not completely rule out a role for uncertainty, 
however, as one could imagine a growing pool of heterogeneous workers in India increasing 
uncertainty about quality in the later period, leading to fewer contracts and a larger ethnic bias.  
A second group of explanations for diaspora connections emphasize enhanced 
communication across places. One form of this argument focuses on language barriers, while a 
second emphasizes the ability of these networks to transfer specialized or tacit knowledge. 
Language barriers appear to play a minimal role. App. Tables 3a-3c present tabulations of hired 
worker characteristics, either generally across foreign countries or in India specifically, by the 
ethnicity of the hiring company contact. These tabulations show that English proficiency scores 
are no different, or even higher, for the workers hired by ethnic Indian company contacts 
compared to peers. In general, English proficiency scores are higher for workers in India than 
outside (4.88 vs. 4.72 on a five-point scale). With respect to the second form, India represents a 
large share of high-end contract work on oDesk. It could be that the bias is due to the facilitation 
of this high-end work, where communication must be even more subtle than general language 
proficiency. Columns 4 and 5 of Table 5 split the sample by whether the job type is high-end.
19 
The ethnic bias is present in both categories, but it is bigger in low-end jobs. This suggests that 
while specialized knowledge transfer may play a role, it is not the primary driver either. 
                                                 
19 High-end contracts include networking and information systems, software development, and web 
development. App. Table 2 shows that these categories have the highest wages on oDesk.  18 
 
Columns 6 and 7 provide some of our most important results. Our data indicate whether 
the hiring employer used the search feature of oDesk while recruiting workers. This search 
feature allows company contacts to select regions in which to search, and they can also utilize 
search strings like “SQL programmer India.” Unfortunately, our data only record if the company 
contact contacted individual workers prior to an organic job application initiated by the worker, 
not the details of the search. Column 6 isolates initial contracts where employers did not utilize 
this capability, while Column 7 considers where employer searches were used. The composition 
of potential hires in the first sample is dictated purely by the workers who respond to the job 
posting; employers actively shape the composition of their candidate pool in the latter case. The 
difference between the two groups is striking—the ethnicity bias among initial contracts built 
upon employer searches is several times stronger, a feature we return to below.  
We close Table 5 with two important robustness checks. Column 8 shows that the results 
in the total sample are robust to dropping the outlier UAE firm noted earlier (which by definition 
only accounts for one initial contract). Column 9 shows similar patterns when looking at fixed-
price contracts. Contracts on oDesk allow for hourly wages or a fixed-price deliverable. We 
focus on hourly contracts given that wage rates are defined and negotiated for these workers. It is 
nevertheless helpful to see that a similar ethnic bias exists in fixed-price work, too. 
In summary, the patterns in Tables 4-5 suggest the ethnicity bias is likely not due to 
uncertainty in the oDesk environment or communication barriers. By contrast, we have found a 
special role for employer search. At a minimum, these results leave several possibilities for why 
ethnic Indians would disproportionately outsource initial contracts to India: 1) taste-based 
preferences, 2) information advantages that ethnic Indians possess, 3) greater bargaining power 
of ethnic Indians with workers in their home region, and 4) productivity advantages that ethnic 
Indians possess when working with India. 
 
6. Wage and Performance Effects of Ethnic-Based Contracts – Base Analysis  
To evaluate the remaining candidate explanations for the ethnic bias, we turn to analyses of wage 
rates and performance effects. This section begins with a particularly intuitive form of these tests 
by simply isolating variation in outcomes among workers in India. Conceptually, this analysis 
provides the workers’ perspectives about the gain or loss from taking on a contract with an 19 
 
overseas Indian company contact. This test provides many basic insights that we build upon in 
the next two sections with a more complicated framework. Table 6 reports regression results for 
wage and performance outcomes, with the four panels considering different dependent variables. 
The regression format is similar to that described for the analyses in Table 4, and column headers 
provide additional details about each estimation approach.  
Panel A analyzes the log wage rate paid on the contract, and Panel B compares the wage 
rate paid to the hired worker to the median proposal made by other workers that bid on the same 
job opportunity. This latter approach provides an attractive baseline of comparison as the bids 
made by other workers are informative about the work opportunity and its technical difficulty. 
The estimates suggest very limited wage effects from the perspective of the worker in India. 
Most variations find that diaspora-based contracts pay the worker about 1% less than comparable 
outsourcing contracts (i.e., same year x job type x country of company contact).
20 App. Table 4 
shows that this holds under further sample splits and variations. We also find very similar results 
when considering outsourcing spells. 
Panels C and D consider performance outcomes. Panel C considers an indicator variable 
that takes a value of one if the public feedback reported about the contract is “good” or better. 
Panel D is constructed similarly, but it is instead taken from a private post-job survey conducted 
for oDesk company contacts. The results in both panels indicate that there are no performance 
differences for diaspora-based contracts relative to their peers. Effects are very small in 
economic magnitude and not statistically significant. The last column shows that the null 
performance results hold when conditioning on worker wage, and a very similar result is 
obtained when conditioning on total worker salary. These results again hold under the many 
sample splits and variations shown in the appendix. More important, App. Table 5 also shows 
that this null result holds when using four other measures of performance: obtaining a wage rate 
increase on the contract, being hired again on oDesk, being rehired by the same company 
contact, and the worker’s wage rate on the next contract that he or she signs. 
                                                 
20 Computational issues require that we report bootstrapped standard errors with re-sampling over workers 
for estimates with worker fixed effects. The comparable estimate for Column 1 is -0.029 (0.013). 20 
 
We interpret these results as suggesting that workers in India operate in a competitive 
environment where they are paid market rates, regardless of whether or not a contract is 
diaspora-based. These results have strong implications for our four remaining hypotheses of 
what determines initial location choice. First, they are potentially consistent with taste-based 
preferences existing on the part of company contacts, but they are not consistent with significant 
levels of taste-based preferences among workers in India. Second, the null results for 
performance and wages—especially the lack of rehiring of workers—do not align with stories 
about ethnic Indians having special match-specific productivity advantages from employing 
workers in India. Similar to observable traits at the time of hire, the future performances of the 
hired workers are not different for ethnic Indians. Third, the very small wage declines suggest 
that bargaining power by ethnic Indians in their home region is not likely.
21  
 
7. A Framework of the Ethnic Outsourcing Bias 
This section sketches a simple framework of ethnic outsourcing that builds upon the empirical 
results derived thus far. This framework organizes our remaining inquiries by showing in 
particular where our current results are observationally similar across accounts. This simple 
framework then motivates a more nuanced test to evaluate the taste- versus information-based 
hypotheses. The basic idea is to identify a particular group of workers in India—inexperienced 
workers—where the ethnic bias is especially strong and compare the diaspora-based differentials 
in their wage and performance outcomes to those of a second group of workers in India—
experienced workers—where the bias is weak. While these tests are more cumbersome than our 
prior analyses, they provide even sharper insights about the origins of the diaspora bias given 
that both groups are located within India. 
We model that there are an exogenous number of similar contracts to be filled in each 
year by oDesk workers. Outsourcing contracts are characterized by wages w and worker quality 
                                                 
21 App. Tables 6 and 7 repeat this analysis using instead variation across contracts initiated by ethnic 
Indians living outside of India. Conceptually, this analysis shifts from the worker’s perspective to that of the hiring 
ethnic Indian. This analysis identifies that ethnic Indians pay about 7.5% less when outsourcing to India than to 
other locations. We also see some suggestive evidence of performance declines compared to other locations. As 
these results are embedded in the framework below and do not shed substantial light on the questions of the ethnic 
bias’ origin, we conserve space and do not report them in the main text. 21 
 
q. There are four types of workers who can be employed for outsourcing work: experienced 
workers in India, inexperienced workers in India, experienced workers outside of India, and 
inexperienced workers outside of India. There are also two types of firm contacts: ethnic Indians 
living outside of India and everyone else outside of India.
22  
A firm f has linear preferences of the form,                   , where β captures the 
trade-off that exists in the market between wages and the quality of workers of type i. Our results 
later show this linear trade-off across quality and wages in the market overall holds reasonably 
well. The parameter γ, indexed by worker and firm type, is either a match-specific productivity 
component, an information component, or a taste-based component, as described below. Finally, 
the ε term is a mean-zero idiosyncratic benefit to a worker-firm match. 
Firms post a job opportunity and receive an exogenous draw of candidates from which to 
choose. Labor demand for a firm of type f is given by maximizing over candidates according to 
the above preferences. If all we had was data on labor demand, it would be impossible to 
distinguish among these components, which is the origin of the common ambiguity between 
taste- and information-based preferences. Our data on productivity, however, afford sharper 
assessments. In particular, if     reflects taste-based preferences rather than match-specific 
complementarity or information differences, then observed productivity should only be a 
function of worker type i and not be a function of the interaction of worker and firm types. This 
is because the     parameters shape selection but not the productivity afforded to various worker 
qualities. On the other hand,     parameters related to added insights about workers or better 
systematic match qualities would be expected to be visible in the form of wages, productivity, or 
both, with one exception outlined below. 
Perhaps an even more realistic possibility is that only a subset of ethnic Indian company 
contacts have a comparative advantage in identifying talented inexperienced Indian workers. In 
                                                 
22 Our framework thus abstracts from the fact that outsourcing firms compare oDesk with offline 
opportunities or with competing online platforms. We also assume that all contracts have the same basic needs, 
reflecting our empirical strategy to look at variation within each year x job type x country of company contact. We 
reported earlier that ethnic Indians are a modest share of the total pool of company contacts and reflective for the 
United States of ethnic Indian involvement in technology fields generally. We thus assume that this ethnic Indian 
group’s share of company contacts in the contract pool is exogenous and not overly influencing market structure.  
 22 
 
this case, differences in aggregate demand for inexperienced workers come from only a small 
number of firms. A test of the statistical discrimination hypothesis is still possible: so long as 
there is variation in hiring within firm, productivity and wage regressions with firm fixed effects 
should differ from pooled OLS regressions because the fixed effects remove firm-specific 
advantages in selecting inexperienced Indian workers. In wage and productivity OLS regressions 
and regressions with firm fixed effects, a null finding would suggest that information differences 
and ethnicity-specific complementarities are not detectible.  
 
8. Wage and Performance Effects of Ethnic-Based Contracts – Redux  
Building upon Section 7’s framework, Table 7 first revisits the initial outsourcing choice 
regressions in Table 4. We redefine the outcome variable in Columns 1-6 to be the hiring of a 
worker in India with five or fewer prior jobs, which we define to be an inexperienced worker. 
We define the outcome variable in Columns 7-12 to be the hiring of an experienced worker in 
India with six or more prior jobs. The means of the dependent variables across the two groups 
are similar, showing that overall hiring of inexperienced and experienced workers in India is 
comparable. The ethnic placement effect is concentrated, however, in the former group of 
inexperienced workers. We obtain similar results when using multinomial logit models that 
allow selection over countries and experience levels. This provides the ethnic hiring differences 
needed to exploit the variation in Section 7’s framework.
23 
These results could be quite consistent with an information-based story where ethnic 
Indians are better able to evaluate and screen inexperienced workers in India. Some earlier 
evidence surround the higher English-language proficiency among workers in India and their 
other observable traits at the time of hire did not indicate a special role for worker screening, but 
                                                 
23 This experience pattern relates to evidence from Agrawal, Lacetera, and Lyons (2012) that workers in 
developing countries have an initial disadvantage on oDesk—one may have expected that diaspora-based links 
could have provided a fruitful opportunity to overcome the initial uncertainty about workers. In general for India, the 
ethnic diaspora appears to have played a limited role in “unlocking careers” by giving workers in India a start. In 
simple descriptive terms, 9.4% of workers in India start with an ethnic Indian employer from outside of India. Of 
workers in India who complete three or more jobs on oDesk, 5.7% of these workers started with an ethnic Indian 
employer, as noted above. In our sample, a little over 5% of our company contacts are ethnic Indian. Given the 
ethnic-based relative effect for selecting an inexperienced worker in Column 2 is about 40%, these estimations are 
showing a similar magnitude to these descriptive features in a more rigorous format, predicing roughly 7% of initial 
starts. 23 
 
such tests may be inaccurate if true informational advantages come from discerning qualities not 
quantified on the oDesk platform at the time of hire. As described when developing our 
framework, we now also use this variation to assess performance outcomes. 
Tables 9 and 10 complete our analysis by considering broader variations across ethnic 
Indian and non-ethnic Indian company contacts with the specification  
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Our outcome variables are the wages and performance ratings on contracts, as indicated in the 
column headers. We also consider whether a worker is hired again on oDesk and the worker’s 
future wages. Our base specifications include fixed effects for year x job type x country of 
company contact and for expected project duration. We then use indicator variables to identify 
three worker traits: location in India, new/inexperienced worker status, and their interaction. The 
β coefficients give the broad implications for non-ethnic Indian contacts. We then include the 
probability that the hiring contact is of ethnic Indian origin and its interaction with these three 
traits. The γ coefficients describe the differences observed for ethnic Indian company contacts.  
The first row of Table 8 shows that workers in India are generally paid lower wages and 
receive weaker performance reviews than workers outside of India. They are also less likely to 
be rehired and receive lower future wages. This pattern is indicative of firms facing a trade-off in 
choosing India as a destination. The second row shows that inexperienced workers receive lower 
wages and worse unconditional performance ratings than experienced workers. Columns 4 and 6, 
which also include the wage as a control variable, find some evidence of inexperienced workers 
having comparable conditional performance ratings, broadly in line with our framework’s 
structure. This is also true when using total salary as a control variable. Finally, the third row 
shows that inexperienced workers in India regain some of the wage reductions evident in the first 
two rows, but not all. They also show some better performance with respect to future hiring. 
The second set of coefficients is our key finding. The γ coefficients on the interaction 
terms deliver null results in almost every specification. This pattern says that all of the 24 
 
consequences (good and bad) from outsourcing to India come through greater engagement with 
the country, not from being an ethnic Indian. This is true for both experienced and inexperienced 
workers, as shown in the interaction variables, and we find similar results when including 
company contact fixed effects in Table 9. The similarity of Tables 8 and 9 suggests that the 
variation in outcomes is not due to some unobserved comparative advantage in working with 
India or in finding relatively productive Indian workers in low-information environments. We 
also find very similar results when considering outsourcing spells, and App. Table 8 shows these 
same patterns when we consider each firm as a unit of observation and aggregate up all of their 
contracts into a single set of wage and performance metrics. The pattern always remains the 
same—that the higher frequency of ethnic-based contracts to India by overseas ethnic Indians 
has its impact only through greater general engagement with India. 
This stark set of results is consistent with a taste-based preferences account, and it is less 
consistent with most other accounts of why ethnic Indians are placing work into India. The most 
prominent candidate that has remained through the discussions so far is an information 
advantage or statistical discrimination role that the Indian diaspora possess. Models of statistical 
discrimination or information advantages can account for the initial ethnic bias in hiring that 
dissipates with worker experience, but they struggle to explain why the ethnic Indian contracts 
with inexperienced workers do not display detectible wage or performance advantages. The 
performance results also cast doubt on persistent differences in prior beliefs for ethnic and non-
ethnic Indian company contacts.
24 From these and prior results, we conclude that taste-based 
                                                 
24 There is a distinction between beliefs about the mean of the distribution and beliefs about the variance. 
Consider the first case where the mean of the distribution of prior beliefs about Indian worker quality is the same for 
all employers but ethnic Indian company contacts have a more precise prior. Standard search theory implies that, for 
employer who repeatedly use oDesk, the option value of sampling Indian workers is higher for non-ethnic Indians. 
This case would produce an ethnicity bias in the opposite direction of the result. In addition, this case suggests that 
posterior beliefs about Indian workers’ productivity change least in response to new information for ethnic Indian 
employers because of their relatively precise priors. Thus, we would expect to observe different responses to prior 
success in India. We find limited difference in success dependence across employer types, suggesting that the 
learning process is similar for both employer types. We cannot rule out the second case, that the means of the prior 
distributions differ. However, this case seems unlikely because ethnic Indian employers do not pay more than non-
ethnic Indian employers when hiring workers in India and performance metrics are similar for both types.  25 
 
preferences among oDesk actors in the originating countries is likely the most important (but 
perhaps not exclusive) driver of the ethnic bias observed in outsourcing to India.
25 
We do not have a strong empirical reason for the bias towards inexperienced Indian 
workers, except to note that it does not carry detectable performance consequences. The oDesk 
marketplace appears to contain a fairly sturdy trade-off between wages and worker quality, 
within and across countries, and this limits the scope for a special ethnic-based relationship. 
Taste-based rationales provide the most consistent explanation for this feature.  
 
9. Conclusion 
Diaspora-based exchanges have been important for centuries, but the online world reduces many 
of the frictions these networks solved. This study investigates the importance of Indian diaspora 
connections on the oDesk platform for outsourcing. We find strong evidence that diaspora still 
matter and influence economic exchanges, even when many frictions are minimized. While 
diaspora connections may not have been the driving force in India becoming the top destination 
for oDesk contracts, they remain important for shaping the flow of outsourcing contracts. In fact, 
our case study suggests that the Indian diaspora’s use of the platform is increasing with time. 
Our study suggests that this importance comes from path dependency in location choices 
and a greater likelihood of overseas ethnic Indians selecting India for their first contract. Initial 
contracts are a very important, almost experimental, period where long-term habits form, and 
                                                 
25 There is one form of information advantages that could persist and explain these results. In Section 7’s 
framework, one can define the γ parameters such that they are a binary representation of the company contact 
knowing the worker is qualified, with ethnic Indians having a higher likelihood of being able to vet an inexperienced 
worker in India. Assuming the ε parameters are sufficiently small in variance, the γ parameters could completely 
define a restricted choice set of vetted candidates. In this case, workers could be chosen according to market-based 
wages and productivity and idiosyncratic match qualities, with ethnic Indians possessing a naturally larger set of 
vetted inexperienced Indian candidates, and thus a larger set of chosen workers. Because the information advantage 
does not influence productivity if the worker is in the set of known qualified workers, it would be observationally 
the same as taste-based preferences, and it would also look the same using variation across and within company 
contacts. It is important to stress, however, the particular nature of these conditions. Most important, this explanation 
requires an almost knife-edge property such that the information content conferred to an ethnic Indian company 
contact for inexperienced Indian workers needs to have the exact same statistical properties as that afforded to a 
non-ethnic Indian company contact when evaluating an experienced Indian worker and an ethnic Indian company 
contact when evaluating an experienced Indian worker; otherwise, performance consequences would become 
evident due to differences in signal quality.   26 
 
ethnic Indians are more likely to choose India initially. Our analysis suggests that taste-based 
preferences play the largest role for these initial choices. This preference may be on the part of 
the ethnic Indians, or it could reflect non-ethnic Indians being more reluctant to select India for 
work. Other factors such as better trust in uncertain environments or information advantages 
could also exist—and in such a complex environment as outsourcing to India are likely to be true 
in certain pockets of activity—but our analyses suggest that these alternatives are less important 
for explaining the overall patterns of ethnic-based outsourcing than taste-based preferences.  
These findings have important managerial consequences. The initial biases of managers 
can result in imperfect long-term arrangements, as path dependence and contentment with the 
status quo produce inertia in further experimentation. As online markets increase competition—
in oDesk’s case by breaking down the strong spatial partitions that have traditionally existed with 
labor markets—these biases may hurt firm performance in significant ways. Innovation and 
entrepreneurship will be particularly sensitive to these pressures given the high potential for 
outsourcing technical and scientific work and the globalization of this field’s labor force.  
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1 United States 31,261         28,233         0.285 0.329 0.039 0.046 10.28
2 Australia 4,162           3,793           0.287 0.293 0.033 0.029 10.04
3 United Kingdom 3,583           3,304           0.280 0.290 0.065 0.079 9.75
4 Canada 2,921           2,632           0.285 0.294 0.065 0.082 9.87
5 UAE 989              884              0.545 0.546 0.906 0.941 11.71
6 Netherlands 384              345              0.297 0.299 0.026 0.013 9.68
7 Germany 360              333              0.227 0.230 0.020 0.024 10.35
8 France 310              289              0.264 0.270 0.017 0.018 10.23
9 Ireland 305              290              0.300 0.301 0.029 0.059 11.41
10 Spain 269              235              0.237 0.243 0.010 0.019 11.93
11 Italy 232              213              0.375 0.387 0.010 0.011 11.25
12 Sweden 219              193              0.270 0.275 0.026 0.014 12.03
13 Israel 216              193              0.229 0.233 0.035 0.079 8.90
14 Belgium 170              158              0.276 0.278 0.023 0.038 10.33
15 Switzerland 170              156              0.184 0.184 0.008 0.024 10.41
16 New Zealand 165              149              0.198 0.198 0.038 0.012 7.17
17 Singapore 159              137              0.212 0.215 0.068 0.038 7.43
18 Denmark 149              130              0.246 0.247 0.004 0.017 9.70
19 Norway 135              123              0.325 0.325 0.010 0.000 10.00
20 Hong Kong 125              110              0.282 0.286 0.014 0.000 9.43
Notes:  Table describes the country distribution and traits of companies hiring workers in India. Outsourcing spells group repeated, sequential contracts 
between the same company and worker. Ethnicities are estimated through individuals' names using techniques described in the text.
Table 1:  Country distribution of companies hiring workers in India
N Country
Number of 
contracts 
with worker 
in India
India's share of 
total contracts 
originating 
from country
India's share of 
total cross-
border contracts 
originating 
from country
Share of 
company 
contacts with 
Indian ethnic 
name
Share of 
company 
contacts hiring 
in India with 
Indian ethnic 
name
Average wage 
in US dollars 
paid on 
contracts with 
worker in India
Number of 
distinct 
outsourcing 
spells with 
worker in 
IndiaShare of company contacts selecting India on:
First contract
Second contract, having chosen India on first contract
Second contract, having not chosen India on first contract
First outsourcing spell
Second spell, having chosen India on first spell
Second spell, having not chosen India on first spell
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(0,1) Success on first contract or worker spell 0.066*** 0.082*** 0.037** 0.124*** 0.147*** 0.098***
(0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Probability that hiring contact is of ethnic Indian origin 0.075* 0.039 0.056 -0.001 0.009 0.009
(0.042) (0.050) (0.049) (0.030) (0.032) (0.033)
Interaction of success on first contract/spell and  -0.031 0.015 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.012
probability that hiring contact is of ethnic Indian origin (0.054) (0.063) (0.063) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044)
Sample demarcation  Contract1 Contract2 Spell Contract1 Contract2 Spell
Observations 6,611 5,093 4,734 11,447 9,926 9,858
Year x job type x country of company contact FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dependent variable 0.573 0.583 0.534 0.578 0.513 0.480
0.01
0.07***
0.01
0.01
0.20
0.39
0.54
0.24
0.33
0.53
0.23
0.19
Notes: Regressions consider persistence in location choice on second outsourcing decisions formed on oDesk by company contacts. The sample includes company 
contacts located outside of India that hired a worker in India for a first contract or outsourcing spell. The dependent variables in Columns 1-3 measure whether the 
company contact chose India again conditional on continuing to outsource work on oDesk. The dependent variables in Columns 4-6 measure continuation on oDesk 
itself. The Contract1 samples consider individual contracts, Contract2 samples consider contracts with at least a one-day gap, and Spell samples consider distinct 
company-worker outsourcing spells. The success regressor is a binary variable that takes unit value if the first contract of the company contact garnered a "good" 
performance rating or higher according to an internal survey or the public feedback score left for the employee. Estimates are unweighted, include fixed effects for 
year x job type x country of company contact, and report robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively.
Table 3: Success dependence for contracting with Indian workers
DV: (0,1) Stay in India on 2nd use DV: (0,1) Continue to use oDesk
Notes: Tabulations consider contracts formed with company contacts located outside of India for whom the name classification algorithm perfectly classifies Indian 
ethnicity. Outsourcing spells group repeated, sequential contracts between the same company and worker. The sample requires a one-day gap to exist between the 
spells to remove rapid turnover situations (e.g., recruitment auditions). Third and subsequent contracts are similar to second contracts. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 2: Path dependence for contracting with Indian workers
Ethnic Indians
(1)
0.39
0.58
Difference
(3)
0.07***
0.01
non-Ethnic Indians
0.32
0.57
(2)Total contract 
sample
Initial 
contracts
Initial 
restricted to 
repeat users
Subsequent 
contracts
Total sample 
with two or 
more prior 
contracts
With prior 
successful 
experience in 
India
With prior 
unsuccessful 
experience in 
India
Without prior 
experience in 
India
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probability that hiring contact 0.047*** 0.058*** 0.069*** 0.043*** 0.039*** 0.032 0.060* 0.024*
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.010) (0.012) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.033) (0.014)
Observations 157,922 35,863 21,289 122,059 100,770 59,220 12,699 28,851
Mean of dependent variable 0.289 0.319 0.311 0.280 0.273 0.345 0.273 0.126
Relative effect 0.163 0.182 0.222 0.154 0.143 0.093 0.220 0.190
Probability that hiring contact 0.041*** 0.072*** 0.098*** 0.029** 0.020 -0.010 0.052 0.062*
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) (0.040) (0.033)
Observations 71,668 20,804 11,923 50,864 40,476 27,570 5,036 7,870
Mean of dependent variable 0.637 0.550 0.555 0.673 0.680 0.741 0.689 0.461
Relative effect 0.064 0.131 0.177 0.043 0.029 -0.013 0.075 0.134
Probability that hiring contact 0.034*** 0.054*** 0.062*** 0.028*** 0.025** 0.020 0.020 0.024**
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.011) (0.016) (0.022) (0.010)
Observations 157,922 35,863 21,289 122,059 100,770 59,220 12,699 28,851
Mean of dependent variable 0.289 0.319 0.311 0.280 0.273 0.345 0.273 0.126
Relative effect 0.118 0.169 0.199 0.100 0.092 0.058 0.073 0.190
Table 4: Selection of India by ethnic origin of company contacts -- oDesk experience levels
Third and later contracts for company contact
Notes:  Contract-level regressions estimate propensities to select a worker in India by the ethnic origin of the company contacts. The sample excludes company 
contacts located in India. The dependent variable is an indicator variable for selecting a worker located in India. Panel A documents the whole sample, and Panel B 
considers cases where a worker from India applies for the position. Panel C includes the share of worker-initiated applications from India and an indicator variable for 
no worker-initiated applications from India. Column headers indicate sample composition. Initial and subsequent contracts are from the perspective of the company 
contact. Regressions are unweighted, include fixed effects for year x job category x country of company contacts, and report standard errors that are two-way clustered 
by originating company and worker. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable is a (0,1) indicator for choosing a worker in India
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Panel A: Total sample, excluding Indian companies
Panel C: Panel A with controls for the share of worker-initiated applications from India
Panel B: Panel A conditional on a worker in India applyingInitial 
contract 
sample
2008 and 
prior
2009 and 
later
High-end 
contracts
Low-end 
contracts
Excluding 
employer 
searches
Only 
employer 
searches
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Probability that hiring contact 0.058*** 0.033 0.069*** 0.038** 0.087*** 0.023 0.124*** 0.046*** 0.042***
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.012) (0.024) (0.014) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010)
Observations 35,863 10,888 24,975 19,768 16,095 23,979 11,884 156,507 138,315
Mean of dependent variable 0.319 0.402 0.283 0.442 0.168 0.328 0.301 0.287 0.234
Relative effect 0.182 0.082 0.244 0.086 0.518 0.070 0.412 0.160 0.179
Probability that hiring contact 0.072*** 0.039 0.086*** 0.043** 0.126*** 0.045** 0.110*** 0.038*** 0.068***
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.016) (0.028) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.019) (0.026) (0.011) (0.015)
Observations 20,804 6,293 14,511 13,157 7,647 15,452 5,352 70,821 58,302
Mean of dependent variable 0.550 0.695 0.487 0.665 0.353 0.509 0.668 0.633 0.555
Relative effect 0.131 0.056 0.177 0.065 0.357 0.088 0.165 0.060 0.123
Probability that hiring contact 0.054*** 0.043** 0.059*** 0.041*** 0.067*** 0.015 0.119*** 0.032*** 0.024***
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.010) (0.019) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.021) (0.008) (0.007)
Observations 35,863 10,888 24,975 19,768 16,095 23,979 11,884 156,507 138,315
Mean of dependent variable 0.319 0.402 0.283 0.442 0.168 0.328 0.301 0.287 0.234
Relative effect 0.169 0.107 0.208 0.093 0.399 0.046 0.395 0.111 0.103
Panel A: Total sample, excluding Indian companies
Panel C: Panel A with controls for the share of worker-initiated applications from India
Notes:  See Table 4.
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Panel B: Panel A conditional on a worker in India applying
Table 5: Selection of India by ethnic origin of company contacts -- base traits of initial contracts
Sample of initial hourly contracts made by company contacts Total sample 
dropping 
UAE outlier 
firm
Sample of 
fixed-price 
contracts
Dependent variable is a (0,1) indicator for choosing a worker in IndiaBase estimation 
Including prior 
feedback and 
controls for 
worker experience
Experienced 
oDesk workers 
with controls for 
lagged wages and 
feedback
New oDesk 
workers without 
prior wages or 
experience
Including worker 
fixed effects
Companies with 
past experience 
with hourly hiring 
in India
Companies with 
past successful 
experience with 
hourly hiring in 
India
Including the 
wage paid on the 
contract as a 
control variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Prob. that hiring contact -0.029 -0.023 -0.008 0.053 -0.015** -0.029 -0.013 n.a.
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.019) (0.019) (0.011) (0.046) (0.006) (0.027) (0.031)
Observations 45,656 45,656 30,423 7,043 45,656 27,699 22,830
Mean of DV 2.120 2.120 2.155 2.008 2.120 2.124 2.123
Prob. that hiring contact -0.012** -0.011* -0.005 0.015 -0.012** -0.009 -0.014 n.a.
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.020) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010)
Observations 45,654 45,654 30,421 7,048 45,654 27,698 22,830
Mean of DV -0.012 -0.012 -0.008 -0.029 -0.012 -0.008 -0.008
Prob. that hiring contact -0.005 -0.004 -0.009 0.022 -0.016 -0.012 -0.001 -0.004
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.036) (0.012) (0.024) (0.025) (0.017)
Observations 36,040 36,040 25,018 5,647 36,040 21,664 18,353 36,040
Mean of DV 0.540 0.540 0.535 0.520 0.540 0.584 0.631 0.540
Relative effect -0.009 -0.007 -0.017 0.042 -0.030 -0.021 -0.002 -0.007
Prob. that hiring contact 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.037 0.007 0.027 0.000 0.005
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.042) (0.024) (0.027) (0.017) (0.017)
Observations 35,790 35,790 24,869 5,627 35,790 21,538 18,264 35,790
Mean of DV 0.620 0.620 0.627 0.593 0.620 0.638 0.680 0.620
Relative effect 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.062 0.011 0.042 0.000 0.008
Panel C: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from public feedback scores (feedback score greater than 4.5/5)
Notes:  Contract-level regressions estimate wage and performance effects from ethnicity-based contracts using variation among workers in India. The sample includes contracts formed between company 
contacts located outside of India and a worker in India. Regressions are unweighted, include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact and expected contract duration buckets, and 
report standard errors that are two-way clustered by originating company and worker. Regressions with worker fixed effects bootstrap standard errors using a cluster resampling procedure with the worker 
as the unit of analysis. Performance observation counts are lower due to ongoing jobs (99% of cases) or missing values.  Worker controls include an indicator variable for whether the worker has previous 
experience, an indicator variable for an experienced worker without feedback, the number of prior jobs, and the feedback score as of the job application. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 6: Wage rate and performance effects among workers in India due to ethnic-based contracts
The sample is contracts formed with workers in India
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact and expected contract duration
Panel B: DV is percentage differential between accepted contract and median proposal
Panel A: DV is log hourly wage paid to worker
Panel D: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from private post-job surveyTotal contract 
sample
Initial 
contracts
Initial 
restricted to 
repeat users
Subsequent 
contracts
Not utilizing 
search 
functionality
Utilizing 
search 
functionality
Total contract 
sample
Initial 
contracts
Initial 
restricted to 
repeat users
Subsequent 
contracts
Not utilizing 
search 
functionality
Utilizing 
search 
functionality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Probability that hiring contact 0.036*** 0.052*** 0.061*** 0.030*** 0.027*** 0.043*** 0.012* 0.006 0.009 0.013* -0.001 0.025***
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011) (0.014) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
Observations 157,922 35,863 21,289 122,059 77,502 80,420 157,922 35,863 21,289 122,059 77,502 80,420
Mean of dependent variable 0.132 0.132 0.131 0.132 0.113 0.150 0.157 0.187 0.180 0.148 0.161 0.154
Relative effect 0.273 0.394 0.466 0.227 0.239 0.287 0.076 0.032 0.050 0.088 0.000 0.162
Probability that hiring contact 0.049*** 0.077*** 0.097*** 0.037** 0.049*** 0.040** -0.008 -0.005 0.001 -0.008 -0.008 -0.005
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.012) (0.015) (0.020) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.016) (0.021) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Observations 71,668 20,804 11,923 50,864 37,440 34,228 71,668 20,804 11,923 50,864 37,440 34,228
Mean of dependent variable 0.291 0.228 0.233 0.316 0.234 0.352 0.346 0.323 0.321 0.356 0.333 0.361
Relative effect 0.168 0.338 0.416 0.117 0.209 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000
Probability that hiring contact 0.030*** 0.050*** 0.057*** 0.024*** 0.020*** 0.038*** 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 -0.010 0.020**
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
Observations 157,922 35,863 21,289 122,059 77,502 80,420 157,922 35,863 21,289 122,059 77,502 80,420
Mean of dependent variable 0.132 0.132 0.131 0.132 0.113 0.150 0.157 0.187 0.180 0.148 0.161 0.154
Relative effect 0.227 0.379 0.435 0.182 0.177 0.253 0.025 0.021 0.028 0.027 -0.062 0.130
Table 7: Selection of India by ethnic origin of company contacts -- worker experience levels 
DV: (0,1) indicator for choosing a worker in India with more than 5 prior jobs
Panel C: Panel A with controls for the share of worker-initiated applications from India
Notes:  See Table 4.
DV: (0,1) indicator for choosing a worker in India with five or fewer prior jobs
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Panel A: Total sample, excluding Indian companies
Panel B: Panel A conditional on a worker in India applyingDV is log hourly 
wage paid to 
worker
DV is percentage 
differential between 
accepted contract 
and median 
proposal
DV is a (0,1) "good 
performance" 
indicator from 
public feedback 
scores
DV is a (0,1) "good 
performance" 
indicator from 
public feedback 
scores
DV is a (0,1) "good 
performance" 
indicator from 
private post-job 
survey
DV is a (0,1) "good 
performance" 
indicator from 
private post-job 
survey
DV is indicator 
variable for worker 
being hired again 
on oDesk
DV is log wage 
of worker's 
NEXT oDesk 
contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline worker traits:
(0,1) indicator that worker is in India -0.147*** -0.078*** -0.022*** -0.017** -0.015** -0.008 -0.011*** -0.162***
(0.014) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.015)
(0,1) worker has completed <= 5 jobs -0.284*** -0.039*** -0.014*** -0.004 -0.024*** -0.010** -0.218*** -0.262***
(0.012) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011)
(0,1) indicator that worker is in India 0.109*** 0.012** 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.059*** 0.110***
x (0,1) worker has completed <= 5 jobs (0.014) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.014)
Ethnic Indian interactions with worker traits:
Prob. that hiring contact is of ethnic Indian origin -0.045 -0.017** -0.020 -0.018 -0.011 -0.009 0.006 -0.017
(0.035) (0.007) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.028)
Prob. that hiring contact is of ethnic Indian origin -0.009 0.005 0.026 0.027 0.029 0.029 0.016 -0.036
x (0,1) indicator that worker is in India (0.026) (0.010) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.012) (0.028)
Prob. that hiring contact is of ethnic Indian origin 0.058 0.000 -0.019 -0.021 0.006 0.004 0.010 -0.002
x (0,1) worker has completed <=5 jobs (0.086) (0.009) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.012) (0.060)
Prob. that hiring contact is of ethnic Indian origin -0.039 0.012 0.011 0.012 -0.019 -0.017 -0.074** 0.053
x (0,1) indicator that worker is in India (0.075) (0.014) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.037) (0.043)
x (0,1) worker has completed <=5 jobs
Additional control for log wage on contract No No No Yes No Yes No No
Observations 157,812 157,809 121,835 121,835 121,131 121,131 157,812 121,509
Mean of dependent variable 1.928 0.0117 0.578 0.578 0.646 0.646 0.770 1.987
Notes:  Contract-level regressions estimate wage and performance effects with interactions for worker experience, company contact ethnicity, and whether a worker is in India. The sample includes all contracts formed on oDesk where the company 
contact is located outside of India. Regressions are unweighted, include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact and expected project duration, and report standard errors that are two-way clustered by originating company and 
worker. Additional controls include an indicator variable for whether the worker has previous experience, an indicator variable for an experienced worker without feedback, the number of prior jobs, and the feedback score as of the job application. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 8: Tests of information, performance, and wage differences by workers' experience levels
The sample is all contracts where the company contact is located outside of India
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Estimates also include fixed effects for expected project duration and controls for the share of worker-initiated applicants from IndiaDV is log hourly 
wage paid to 
worker
DV is percentage 
differential between 
accepted contract 
and median 
proposal
DV is a (0,1) "good 
performance" 
indicator from 
public feedback 
scores
DV is a (0,1) "good 
performance" 
indicator from 
public feedback 
scores
DV is a (0,1) "good 
performance" 
indicator from 
private post-job 
survey
DV is a (0,1) "good 
performance" 
indicator from 
private post-job 
survey
DV is indicator 
variable for worker 
being hired again 
on oDesk
DV is log wage 
of worker's 
NEXT oDesk 
contract
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Baseline worker traits:
(0,1) indicator that worker is in India -0.099*** -0.063*** -0.043*** -0.037*** -0.018* -0.013 -0.023*** -0.127***
(0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015)
(0,1) worker has completed <= 5 jobs -0.155*** -0.023*** -0.005 0.005 -0.007 0.001 -0.189*** -0.165***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.010)
(0,1) indicator that worker is in India 0.058*** 0.009 -0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.051*** 0.066***
x (0,1) worker has completed <= 5 jobs (0.011) (0.006) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.015)
Ethnic Indian interactions with worker traits:
Prob. that hiring contact is of ethnic Indian origin -0.017 0.008 0.022 0.023 0.006 0.008 -0.009 -0.011
x (0,1) indicator that worker is in India (0.036) (0.023) (0.033) (0.033) (0.045) (0.046) (0.025) (0.049)
Prob. that hiring contact is of ethnic Indian origin 0.145 -0.006 -0.013 -0.022 0.012 0.004 -0.026 0.075
x (0,1) worker has completed <=5 jobs (0.136) (0.015) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.021) (0.116)
Prob. that hiring contact is of ethnic Indian origin -0.140 0.024 0.013 0.020 -0.018 -0.012 -0.080 -0.030
x (0,1) indicator that worker is in India (0.111) (0.023) (0.042) (0.045) (0.041) (0.041) (0.050) (0.064)
x (0,1) worker has completed <=5 jobs
Additional control for log wage on contract No No No Yes No Yes No No
Observations 157,812 157,809 121,835 121,835 121,131 121,131 157,812 121,509
Mean of dependent variable 1.928 0.0117 0.578 0.578 0.646 0.646 0.770 1.987
Notes:  See Table 8. Estimations include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact x company contact.
Table 9: Tests of information, performance, and wage differences by workers' experience levels -- variation within employers
The sample is all contracts where the company contact is located outside of India
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact x company contact
Estimates also include fixed effects for expected project duration and controls for the share of worker-initiated applicants from IndiaOnline Appendix to Ghani, Kerr and Stanton (2013)N
Number of contracts 
with worker in India
India's share of total 
contracts originating 
from company
Company contact has 
ethnic Indian name US state
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 118 1.00 No Virginia
2 94 0.98 No California
3 73 0.26 No Florida
4 62 0.93 No Virginia
5 53 1.00 No Connecticut
6 51 0.98 No Wisconsin
7 46 0.38 No Florida
8 45 0.68 Yes New York
9 44 0.39 No California
10 42 0.36 No Nevada
11 40 0.56 No Arizona
12 40 0.63 No California
N
Number of contracts 
with worker in India
India's share of total 
contracts originating 
from company
Company contact has 
ethnic Indian name Primary country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1 906 0.58 Yes United Arab Emirates
2 68 0.36 No United Kingdom
3 58 0.53 No United Kingdom
4 46 0.84 No Italy
5 45 0.34 No Australia
6 44 1.00 No Netherlands
7 42 0.14 No Spain
8 40 0.38 No Australia
9 39 0.87 No United Kingdom
10 29 0.31 No Australia
11 29 0.32 No United Kingdom
12 29 0.63 No Denmark
App. Table 1b:  Largest non-US companies hiring workers in India
App. Table 1a:  Largest US companies hiring workers in IndiaJob category Total
Ethnic Indians 
who are hiring 
abroad
Non-ethnic 
Indians who 
are hiring 
abroad
Ethnic Indians 
who are hiring 
in India
Non-ethnic 
Indians who 
are hiring in 
India Total
Ethnic Indians 
who are hiring 
in India
Non-ethnic 
Indians who 
are hiring in 
India
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Total count 102,819       3,333               85,151             1,296               28,394             55,122             1,590               14,155            
Networking & inform. systems 2% 2% 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 2%
Software development 7% 9% 7% 8% 8% 8% 37% 7%
Web development 40% 42% 42% 57% 63% 38% 41% 62%
Design & multimedia 9% 8% 9% 6% 6% 10% 4% 7%
Writing & translation 10% 9% 8% 6% 3% 11% 2% 4%
Business services 2% 1% 2% 1% 1% 2% 2% 1%
Customer service 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 3% 0%
Sales & marketing 10% 11% 10% 9% 7% 10% 4% 8%
Administrative support 20% 16% 20% 10% 10% 18% 6% 9%
Total  8.6               8.6                   8.4                   9.3                   9.6                   8.7                   9.7                   9.5                  
Networking & inform. systems 16.7             13.9                 16.7                 11.1                 12.2                 16.7                 10.6                 12.4                
Software development 15.0             15.6                 15.0                 12.2                 13.4                 15.0                 10.5                 13.3                
Web development 12.2             11.1                 12.0                 11.1                 11.1                 12.0                 11.0                 11.1                
Design & multimedia 11.1             10.0                 10.0                 11.1                 11.0                 11.0                 10.0                 10.0                
Writing & translation 5.6               5.6                   4.4                   5.3                   5.0                   5.6                   4.4                   4.4                  
Business services 5.0               3.5                   3.3                   5.5                   4.4                   5.6                   6.0                   5.6                  
Customer service 3.3               2.2                   3.3                   3.3                   4.4                   5.6                   10.0                 3.5                  
Sales & marketing 3.3               4.0                   3.3                   4.5                   4.4                   3.9                   3.9                   4.4                  
Administrative support 2.2               2.2                   2.2                   2.2                   2.2                   2.2                   2.8                   2.2                  
App. Table 2:  Distribution of oDesk job types and wage rates paid
Panel A. Observation counts 
Panel C. Median hourly wage paid to worker
Notes: Wage rates are calculated as the median wage paid to workers and are expressed in dollars. Sample includes contracts with ethnic name matches and identified job 
category classifications. Sample splits in columns 3-6 and 8-9 exclude company contacts for which a partial Indian ethnicity assignment is made. 
Companies in United States
Companies outside of the United States, 
excluding India
Panel B. Distribution of job types (ordered by median wage as shown in Panel C)Worker's 
average past 
wages 
Worker's total 
oDesk hours 
worked
Worker's past 
average good 
performance 
rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probability that hiring contact 0.001 0.010 0.000 -0.010 0.003 0.048 -0.523 0.010
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.005) (0.131) (2.665) (0.011)
Observations 70,364 70,364 70,364 67,245 70,364 54,168 54,168 26,622
Mean of dependent variable 0.770 0.073 0.106 4.789 0.044 7.569 62.73 0.550
Relative effect 0.001 0.137 0.000 -0.002 0.068 0.006 -0.008 0.018
Probability that hiring contact -0.007 0.008 0.020 0.032** -0.005 -0.409** 1.438 -0.002
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.005) (0.162) (3.650) (0.011)
Observations 71,989 71,989 71,989 67,988 71,989 57,103 57,103 28,824
Mean of dependent variable 0.794 0.068 0.132 4.705 0.056 9.925 87.18 0.589
Relative effect -0.009 0.118 0.152 0.007 0.000 -0.040 0.016 -0.003
App. Table 3a: Descriptive traits of foreign workers by ethnicity of company contacts 
Indicator for 
hired worker 
having prior 
oDesk 
experience
Self-reported 
English 
proficiency of 
worker
Indicator for 
missing English 
proficiency
Sample of experienced workers Indicator for 
hired worker 
having five or 
fewer previous 
oDesk jobs
Indicator for 
hired worker 
being affiliated 
with an agency
Column headers indicate trait of worker analyzed
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Panel B: Worker traits for company contacts utilizing worker search
Notes:  Contract-level regressions estimate differences in traits of initial workers hired by ethnicity of the hiring company contact outside of India. Panel A documents employers not using 
the search functionality, and Panel B considers cases where the functionality is employed. Traits of workers are indicated by column headers. Regressions are unweighted, include fixed 
effects for year x job type x country of company contact, and report standard errors that are clustered by originating company. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Worker traits for company contacts not utilizing worker search features
Total sample of company contacts located outside of India that are hiring abroadWorker's 
average past log 
wages 
Worker's total 
past oDesk 
hours worked
Worker's past 
average good 
performance 
rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Probability that hiring contact -0.025 0.058*** 0.007 -0.011 0.002 -0.023 4.869 0.009
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.017) (0.022) (0.017) (0.013) (0.007) (0.024) (5.253) (0.020)
Observations 21,239 21,239 21,239 20,294 21,239 17,163 17,163 8,923
Mean of dependent variable 0.808 0.413 0.490 4.888 0.0445 1.968 71.12 0.503
Relative effect -0.031 0.140 0.014 -0.002 0.045 -0.012 0.068 0.018
Probability that hiring contact -0.028* 0.032* -0.023 0.016 -0.008 -0.047* -1.833 0.017
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.013) (0.009) (0.026) (5.723) (0.017)
Observations 24,417 24,417 24,417 22,694 24,417 19,171 19,171 9,948
Mean of dependent variable 0.785 0.494 0.622 4.872 0.0706 2.175 102.7 0.541
Relative effect -0.036 0.065 -0.032 0.003 -0.114 -0.022 -0.018 0.031
Notes:  See App. Table 3a. Contract-level regressions estimate differences in traits of workers in India hired by ethnicity of the hiring company contact outside of India.
App. Table 3b: Descriptive traits of workers in India by ethnicity of company contacts 
Indicator for 
hired worker 
having prior 
oDesk 
experience
Self-reported 
English 
proficiency of 
worker
Indicator for 
missing English 
proficiency
Sample of experienced workers
Column headers indicate trait of worker analyzed
Total sample of company contacts located outside of India that are hiring in India
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Panel A: Worker traits for company contacts not utilizing worker search features
Panel B: Worker traits for company contacts utilizing worker search
Indicator for 
hired worker 
having five or 
fewer previous 
oDesk jobs
Indicator for 
hired worker 
being affiliated 
with an agencyWorker's average 
past log wages 
Worker's total past 
oDesk hours 
worked
Worker's past 
average good 
performance rating
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Probability that hiring contact -0.011 -0.003 0.021 -0.015 -0.029 -3.481 0.024
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.018) (0.020) (0.015) (0.011) (0.030) (9.251) (0.025)
Observations 20,733 20,733 18,477 20,733 11,629 11,629 7,898
Mean of dependent variable 0.561 0.579 4.839 0.109 2.058 114.6 0.523
Relative effect -0.020 -0.005 0.004 -0.138 -0.014 -0.030 0.046
Column headers indicate trait of worker analyzed
Total sample of company contacts located outside of India hiring workers in India with five or fewer prior jobs
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact
Notes:  See App. Table 3a. Contract-level regressions estimate differences in traits of inexperienced workers in India hired by ethnicity of the hiring company contact outside of 
India.
App. Table 3c: Traits of inexperienced workers in India by ethnicity of company contacts 
Indicator for hired 
worker having 
prior oDesk 
experience
Self-reported 
English proficiency 
of worker
Indicator for 
missing English 
proficiency
Sample of experienced workers Indicator for hired 
worker being 
affiliated with an 
agencyInitial 
contracts
Initial 
restricted to 
repeat users
Subsequent 
contracts
2008 and 
prior
2009 and 
later
High-end 
contracts
Low-end 
contracts
Excluding 
employer 
searches
Only 
employer 
searches
Workers with 
good English 
skills
Workers with 
poor English 
skills
Drop UAE 
outlier firm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Prob. that hiring contact -0.040** -0.045* -0.029 -0.027 -0.031 -0.039* -0.0105 -0.019 -0.049 -0.026 -0.054 -0.029
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.020) (0.028) (0.024) (0.027) (0.023) (0.021) (0.037) (0.020) (0.030) (0.019) (0.055) (0.019)
Observations 11,489 6,656 34,166 14,099 31,557 32,628 13,028 26,681 18,975 38,462 4,526 44,848
Mean of DV 2.218 2.185 2.086 2.375 2.005 2.392 1.438 2.010 2.274 2.145 2.038 2.116
Prob. that hiring contact -0.014 -0.022* -0.011 -0.011 -0.014* -0.019*** -0.001 -0.028*** 0.004 -0.012* -0.019 -0.011*
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.015) (0.006)
Observations 11,488 6,656 34,166 14,099 31,555 32,626 13,028 26,681 18,973 38,462 4,526 44,846
Mean of DV -0.018 -0.024 -0.009 -0.006 -0.014 -0.009 -0.017 -0.023 0.005 -0.009 -0.024 -0.012
Prob. that hiring contact -0.005 0.009 -0.003 -0.032 0.007 -0.000 -0.016 -0.009 -0.002 -0.003 0.016 -0.009
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.024) (0.031) (0.021) (0.033) (0.019) (0.020) (0.029) (0.021) (0.024) (0.018) (0.045) (0.017)
Observations 9,181 5,727 26,879 12,956 23,084 25,672 10,368 20,971 15,069 30,844 3,474 35,409
Mean of DV 0.466 0.511 0.566 0.425 0.605 0.532 0.562 0.516 0.574 0.546 0.482 0.533
Prob. that hiring contact 0.008 0.017 -0.002 -0.014 0.010 0.007 -0.006 -0.000 0.002 0.004 0.049 0.001
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.024) (0.031) (0.021) (0.029) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) (0.049) (0.017)
Observations 9,091 5,692 26,699 12,862 22,928 25,483 10,307 20,842 14,948 30,644 3,438 35,160
Mean of DV 0.596 0.604 0.628 0.582 0.640 0.616 0.628 0.589 0.662 0.623 0.600 0.616
Panel C: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from public feedback scores (feedback score greater than 4.5/5)
Panel D: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from private post-job survey
Notes:  See Table 6.
App. Table 4: Separate analyses of Table 6 by split samples
The sample is contracts formed with workers in India
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact and expected contract duration
Panel A: DV is log hourly wage paid to worker
Panel B: DV is percentage differential between accepted contract and median proposalDV is indicator variable for 
wage rate increase on current 
oDesk contract
DV is indicator variable for 
worker being hired again on 
oDesk
DV is indicator variable for 
worker being rehired by 
company
DV is log wage of worker's 
NEXT oDesk contract
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prob. that hiring contact -0.003 -0.002 0.004 -0.035*
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.003) (0.010) (0.005) (0.018)
Observations 45,656 45,656 45,656 36,339
Mean of DV 0.022 0.796 0.039 2.156
Prob. that hiring contact -0.002 -0.015 -0.000 0.028
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.008) (0.027) (0.011) (0.038)
Observations 9,311 9,311 9,311 5,811
Mean of DV 0.035 0.624 0.062 2.051
Prob. that hiring contact -0.006 0.005 0.006 -0.010
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.005) (0.016) (0.008) (0.025)
Observations 20,733 20,733 20,733 14,803
Mean of DV 0.027 0.714 0.051 2.117
Notes:  See Table 6.
App. Table 5:  Table 6's analysis with additional outcome variables
Panel A:  The sample is contracts formed with workers in India
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact and expected contract duration
Panel B:  The sample is contracts formed with workers in India on their first hourly contract
Panel C:  The sample is contracts formed with workers in India with five or fewer prior contractsBase estimation 
Including prior 
feedback and 
controls for 
worker experience
Experienced 
oDesk workers 
with controls for 
lagged wages and 
feedback
New oDesk 
workers without 
prior wages or 
experience
Including 
company fixed 
effects
Companies with 
past experience 
with hourly hiring 
in India
Companies with 
past successful 
experience with 
hourly hiring in 
India
Including the 
wage paid on the 
contract as a 
control variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(0,1) indicator that -0.152*** -0.146*** -0.054*** -0.252 -0.166*** -0.147** -0.163** n.a.
worker is in India (0.041) (0.042) (0.020) (0.165) (0.059) (0.068) (0.069)
Observations 7,640 7,640 4,519 1,528 7,640 4,334 3,685
Mean of DV 2.013 2.013 2.023 2.001 2.013 2.045 2.094
(0,1) indicator that -0.023** -0.022** -0.017* -0.004 -0.017 -0.009 -0.008 n.a.
worker is in India (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.023) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013)
Observations 7,640 7,640 4,538 1,528 7,640 4,348 3,686
Mean of DV 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0,1) indicator that -0.012 -0.009 -0.014 -0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.004 -0.002
worker is in India (0.017) (0.016) (0.021) (0.031) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
Observations 5,935 5,935 3,642 1,245 5,935 3,347 2,883 5,935
Mean of DV 0.623 0.623 0.592 0.660 0.623 0.679 0.679 0.623
Relative effect -0.019 -0.014 -0.024 -0.005 -0.008 0.001 0.006 -0.003
(0,1) indicator that -0.032* -0.032* -0.015 -0.054* -0.036 0.003 0.014 -0.022
worker is in India (0.018) (0.018) (0.021) (0.029) (0.023) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)
Observations 5,900 5,900 3,619 1,244 5,900 3,338 2,879 5,900
Mean of DV 0.677 0.677 0.665 0.700 0.677 0.700 0.700 0.677
Relative effect -0.047 -0.047 -0.023 -0.077 -0.053 0.004 0.020 -0.032
Panel C: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from public feedback scores (feedback score greater than 4.5/5)
Notes:  Contract-level regressions estimate wage and performance effects from ethnicity-based contracts using variation among ethnic Indian company contacts located outside of India. Regressions 
are unweighted, include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact and expected contract duration buckets, and report standard errors that are two-way clustered by originating 
company and worker.  Regressions with worker fixed effects bootstrap standard errors using the procedure described in Table 6.  Performance observation counts are lower due to ongoing jobs (99% 
of cases) or missing values. Worker controls are those listed in Table 6. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
App. Table 6: Wage rate and performance effects among ethnic Indian company contacts due to contracts with India
The sample is contracts formed with ethnic Indian company contacts 
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact and expected contract duration
Panel A: DV is log hourly wage paid to worker
Panel B: DV is percentage differential between accepted contract and median proposal
Panel D: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from private post-job surveyInitial 
contracts
Initial 
restricted to 
repeat users
Subsequent 
contracts
2008 and 
prior
2009 and 
later
High-end 
contracts
Low-end 
contracts
Excluding 
employer 
searches
Only 
employer 
searches
Workers with 
good English 
skills
Workers with 
poor English 
skills
Drop UAE 
outlier firm
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(0,1) indicator that -0.132*** -0.137** -0.158*** -0.098** -0.166*** -0.181*** -0.103** -0.132*** -0.191*** -0.112*** -0.182*** -0.110***
worker is in India (0.037) (0.055) (0.050) (0.039) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.039) (0.059) (0.028) (0.060) (0.029)
Observations 1,687 957 5,953 1,447 6,193 4,180 3,460 4,463 3,177 5,642 1,321 5,883
Mean of DV 2.103 2.019 1.990 2.200 1.970 2.444 1.492 1.903 2.167 1.989 1.995 1.896
(0,1) indicator that -0.046*** -0.032* -0.014 -0.038*** -0.021** -0.030** -0.016 -0.046*** 0.009 -0.024** -0.034* -0.031***
worker is in India (0.016) (0.019) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010)
Observations 1,687 957 5,953 1,447 6,193 4,180 3,460 4,463 3,178 5,642 1,321 5,883
Mean of DV -0.004 -0.027 0.000 0.006 -0.020 -0.006 0.007 -0.010 0.013 0.003 -0.012 -0.00129
(0,1) indicator that -0.048 -0.053 -0.003 -0.070* 0.006 -0.022 0.005 -0.030 0.010 0.001 -0.067 -0.015
worker is in India (0.034) (0.044) (0.018) (0.037) (0.017) (0.023) (0.026) (0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.042) (0.021)
Observations 1,344 816 4,591 1,350 4,585 3,247 2,688 3,379 2,556 4,463 1,021 4,578
Mean of DV 0.529 0.576 0.651 0.442 0.677 0.657 0.583 0.601 0.653 0.612 0.593 0.536
(0,1) indicator that -0.066*** -0.073* -0.019 -0.059 -0.024 -0.040* -0.018 -0.053** -0.011 -0.020 -0.063 -0.038*
worker is in India (0.033) (0.043) (0.019) (0.037) (0.019) (0.023) (0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.018) (0.044) (0.021)
Observations 1,326 810 4,576 1,333 4,567 3,229 2,671 3,362 2,538 4,432 1,016 4,544
Mean of DV 0.655 0.671 0.683 0.617 0.694 0.699 0.651 0.658 0.703 0.667 0.674 0.636
Notes:  See App. Table 6.
App. Table 7: Separate analyses of App. Table 6 by split samples
The sample is contracts formed with ethnic Indian company contacts 
Estimates include fixed effects for year x job type x country of company contact and expected contract duration
Panel A: DV is log hourly wage paid to worker
Panel B: DV is percentage differential between accepted contract and median proposal
Panel C: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from public feedback scores (feedback score greater than 4.5/5)
Panel D: DV is a (0,1) "good performance" indicator from private post-job surveyDV is log average 
wage rate paid on 
oDesk
DV is cumulative 
percentage 
differential between 
contracts and median 
proposals
DV is average "good 
performance" ratings 
over contracts from 
feedback
DV is average "good 
performance" ratings 
over contracts from 
private success survey
DV is number of 
workers hired divided 
by total number of 
contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of contracts that are  -0.091*** -0.073*** -0.064*** -0.068*** 0.019***
formed with workers in India (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.002)
Prob. that hiring contact -0.042* -0.025*** -0.001 -0.000 0.007
is of ethnic Indian origin (0.024) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005)
Share of contracts that are  0.006 0.022 -0.001 0.015 -0.002
formed with workers in India (0.035) (0.015) (0.030) (0.030) (0.009)
x Prob. that hiring contact
   is of ethnic Indian origin
Observations 35,863 35,862 30,097 29,899 35,863
Mean of dependent variable 2.088 0.026 0.510 0.637 0.935
Notes:  Company contact-level regressions estimate wage and performance effects from ethnicity-based contracts using variation among company contacts located 
outside of India. Regressions are unweighted, include fixed effects for first year x modal job type x country of company contact, and report robust standard errors. 
Performance observation counts are lower due to ongoing jobs (99% of cases) or missing values. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.
App. Table 8:  Analysis of bundled contract attributes at company level
Each observation is a unique company contact located outside of India
Estimates include fixed effects for company's first year x modal job type x country of company contact